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Although often shortened to “Ise,” Ise Jingū complex in Japan has over one
hundred shrines, some represented by a single rock or tree, scattered
throughout the cypress forests around Ise city.1 The two main shrines, the
Naikū and Gekū, represent Japan’s finest examples of shikinen sengū, the
practice of periodic rebuilding in accordance with Shintō rituals of seasonal
renewal and purification, and they have fascinated scholars of aesthetics in
Japan and the west. The purpose of this article is to explore the role of Ise in
discourses that separate Western and Japanese aesthetics, the former usually
characterized as static and “idealist” and the latter as dynamic and
“materialist.” Acknowledging James Tartaglia’s “hypothesis of
transcendence,” that there are “matters in need of reflection and explanation
that are more or less bound to occur to people, irrespective of their cultural
and historical background,” I shall argue that these aesthetic traditions are
fundamentally similar.2
We begin with a brief description of the shrines, which date to Emperor
Suinin (reigned 29 B.C.E.–70 C.E.) and Emperor Yūryaku (reigned 456–479).
The Naikū houses one of the main gods—or kami—of Shintō, the sun-
goddess Amaterasu, and it was established when Princess Yamato, Suinin’s
daughter, was tasked with relocating Amaterasu away from the imperial
court, where she was believed to be maliciously causing smallpox and
influenza epidemics. The Gekū, established later, houses Toyouke, kami of
food and harvests. The temples are cypress-wood huts raised on stilts and
topped with miscanthus thatch, set in compounds floored with white
pebbles. Their aesthetic is simple, reflecting the rice granaries from which
they derived. Opulent decoration and materials are used sparingly, limited
to incised gold–copper sheets for doors, stairs, and the projecting gable
beams and logs (katsuogi) along the roofline. Surrounding the shrines are
four fences, with the ordinary pilgrim allowed only beyond the first. The
sengū was inaugurated as an official Shintō practice by Emperor Tenmu
(reigned 673–86), and barring two intervals (1463–1485 during the
Warring States period and 1949–1953 during the post-World War II Allied
Occupation), the shrines have been refashioned every twenty years. Alsot & West Volume 68, Number 3 July 2018 802–825
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refashioned are sixteen other major shrines and sixty-five subsidiary
buildings including Treasure Houses and Halls of Offering. But the Naikū
and Gekū are not simply dismantled and then rebuilt: new versions are
built alongside the old on alternating sites, the goshoden housing the old
and the kodenshi receiving the new. Once the new shrines are conse-
crated, the names of the sites are switched, and for several months the
Naikū and Gekū exist side-by-side with their identical yet dilapidated pre-
iterations in a perplexing ontological and semiological limbo.
Fig. 1. The impossible view: aerial shot of the old (lower) and new (upper) compounds of the
Naiku shrine, including Treasure Houses and Halls of Offering, after the sengū of 1953. The old
compound was then dismantled, reverting from goshoden to kodenshi, and left empty save for
the hut and shin-no-mihashira that marked the spot of the shrine’s return in the next cycle.
(Image: Asahi Shimbun, ‘Best of News Pictures, 1954’)
Finally, the old shrines are dismantled and their materials recycled into
souvenir relics and lesser shrines around Japan, or buried in secret sites. The
kodenshi then lie empty save for huts in the center of each, which protect
the “sacred heart pillar” (shin-no-mihashira) and mark where the shrines
must return in the next cycle.3 To anyone familiar with the Western
assumption that cultural authenticity and value are linked to the preservation
of original artifacts, the shrines at this moment offer a startling challenge.
Ise has served Japanese and Western scholars as a focal point around
which to debate their differences. Three themes have dominatedSimon Richards 803
804these debates: first, the aspiration toward ideal form; second, the
aesthetic of concealment, perishability, and decay; third, the reproduc-
tion of culture. More specifically, and when mapped onto assumed
regional affiliations, commentators have asked whether Ise might be
understood in terms of Western philosophical idealism, of the traditional
Japanese aestheticization of incompleteness, or of post-structuralist
arguments about the reproducibility and valuelessness of all cultures.
The idealist line characterizes idealism as the aspiration to retain perfect
forms forever and considers this incompatible with Ise and Japanese
aesthetics, a characterization that contributes to the “oppositional
paradigm” between Eastern and Western philosophy.4 My thesis involves
a more nuanced reading that suggests deep affinities with traditional
Japanese aesthetics.
There are caveats to be made, however, as scholars of aesthetics often
blur the details of different practices and tastes. Michael Marra noted this of
Japan after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Once opened to the west, “the
vocabulary of premodern Japanese poetics . . . were transformed into aes-
thetic discourses [that] came to be used to indicate the ‘spirit’ [of Japan].” Key
terms were invented for a culture that historically had no sense or need of
them, not only “beauty” (bi) and “aesthetics” (bigaku), for example, but also
“art” (geijutsu) and “fine arts” (bijutsu).5 The incorporation of Japanese art
under Western aesthetics—and idealism, G.W.F. Hegel’s variant in particular,
was the first to be imported in the 1870s—fuelled arguments that this
alienated the Japanese from their traditions and “the reality of difference and
diversity.”6 Commentators seem increasingly wary of discussing affinities
between aesthetic cultures, sensing here a kind of intellectual colonization.7
But it is possible that the resulting segregation relies upon—indeed, may
cause—a partial reading of both traditions. If the literary philosopher Karatani
Kōjin, a fierce critic of the imposition of Western aesthetics, can advocate
“bracketing” irreconcilables in order to explore common ground, then this is
perhaps not merely a symptom of “hegemonic western visual culture.”8
This article has two sections, divided thematically.
The first is themed to modernist architecture and traditional Japanese
aesthetics. It explores how Ise was discussed among architects, who
presented it as an amalgam of Japanese tradition, proto-modernist abstrac-
tion, and idealism, which was questioned in a later post-structuralist reading.
Ambiguities in this reading are used to reconsider a materialist–idealist
dialectic as a bridge between aesthetic cultures, and the section ends by
reading similar ambiguities back into traditional Japanese aesthetics.
The second section is themed to classical idealism, its contested
interpretations, and its uptake and interrogation in Japan. It begins with
recent accounts of Ise, which reinforce the argument that idealism is
inimical to Japanese aesthetics, before exploring more dynamic interpreta-
tions of idealism and the affinities these imply. It is argued that the mostPhilosophy East & West
strenuous attempts to segregate these aesthetics often reveal more in
common than perhaps intended.
“The Refinement of the Transitory”: Modernist Architecture and Traditional
Japanese Aesthetics
Ise and modernism: Taut, Tange, and Kawazoe
Ise did not always play a role in discussions of aesthetics. For most of its history,
it served the Japanese primarily as a site of imperial identification, pilgrimage,
and tourism. After the 1868 Restoration, foreign visitors dismissed the buildings
as miserable huts and were enraptured by the grandeur and expressiveness of
shōgun mausolea, reflecting the decorative bias of late-Victorian taste. But the
German architect Bruno Taut wrote and lectured in Japan from 1933 until 1936,
and Ise caught his eye. The finest architecture, for Taut, eliminated decoration to
focus on simple geometric shapes, often making a display of its own
construction. In Houses and People of Japan (1937), Taut described the shrines
as “extremely simple, even plain, but it is an intended refinement of the wholly
reasonable.” In other words, it was the perfect expression of function. Here “The
art of omission is pushed to the extreme . . . [for] an architectural purity
achieved by simplicity that cannot be surpassed and does not exist anywhere
else in the world, not even in Japan.” But as well as being “uniquely” Japanese—
particularly for the sengū that “ever renews itself like eternal living nature [for]
the refinement of the transitory”—Taut also presented Ise in relation to modernist
architecture: he discerned in the simple lines and expression of function an
aesthetic that prefigured and justified the best of what was increasingly to be
found in Europe, in the buildings of Le Corbusier, Gerrit Rietveld, Walter
Gropius, and indeed himself.9
As Jonathan Reynolds has demonstrated, this “modernist construction” of
an aesthetic around Ise was reenergized in the 1960s by the architect Tange
Kenzō and journalist Kawazoe Noburō. They subjected Ise Shrine—which
had become tainted due to its spiritual legitimization of Japanese imperial
expansion—to “rehabilitation [that] neutralized” these associations, such that
“aspects of the shrines’ history could be utilized to promote new cultural
practises.” Ise was again recruited to publicize contemporary architecture, in
this case the “Metabolist” movement. Launched at the World Design
Conference in Tokyo in 1960, Metabolism combined the clean, elegant
aesthetic of 1920s–30s modernism, the heavy massing, and rough-cast
concrete of its post-WWII “Brutalist” phase, with a brand-new process-
oriented rather than goal-oriented design approach that prioritized indetermi-
nacy and flexibility. Metabolist buildings and cities would change, grow, and
adapt in ways analogous—metaphorically, at least—to metabolic processes.
The Ise shrines, with their clean lines, bold shapes, natural materials and
textures, and dynamic life and death, were seen as prefiguring all this. This
was the agenda underlying the jointly authored book, Ise: Prototype ofSimon Richards 805
806Japanese Architecture (1962), in which Tange and Kawazoe were aided by
the cunningly composed and cropped photographs of Watanabe Yoshio,
which emphasized the abstract proto-modernist qualities of the shrines, as
well as by the book design of Nippon Design Center Inc., representing now-
classic 1960s modernist chic.10
For their interpretation, Tange and Kawazoe deferred also to Fukuyama
Toshio, who in the 1930s and ‘40s had published widely on Japanese
antiquities including his own archaeological work on the raised storehouse
building type used for the shrines. Through Fukuyama they acknowledged that
Ise borrowed decorative motifs from China and also that the raised storehouse
was an import to Japan from other Pacific island cultures; yet both agreed with
Fukuyama that there was something quintessentially Japanese about the sengū
and something formally pure about the designs as well. The rebuilds were an
attempt to preserve or rediscover this. Remove the imported decoration and
there was “quintessential form, behind the tangible shapes,” according to
Tange. Kawazoe agreed that, despite some variation over the years, “the
architectural style of the principal buildings . . . was almost the same as it is
today.” And of course they stressed the modernity of Ise, with Kawazoe
admiring its “structural beauty, known as the ‘Mondrian pattern,’ which relies
on interplay of horizontals and verticals.”11
The aesthetic behind Piet Mondrian’s sparse, rectilinear canvasses was
explained in his essay “Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art” (1934), which
detailed the struggle between dual tendencies in human nature. Subjectivity
(manifested in emotional, figurative, and narrative art) fought objectivity
(manifested in abstract art), but the “evolutionary” triumph of the latter was
imminent. All art would soon commit to “representing reality objectively”
and to “universal beauty.” This aesthetic, which aspired paradoxically to
encapsulate in visual form a transcendental reality that lay beyond the grasp
of the senses, was derived from The Republic of Plato, and so too was the
sense of struggle against the limitations of our animal nature: “time is a
process of intensification . . . toward the essence of things and of ourselves
. . . Our human capacities do not allow of a perfectly objective view, but
that does not imply that the plastic expression of art is based on subjective
expression.”12 Another key influence on Tange and Kawazoe was Le
Corbusier, the best-known European architect in the world at this time, who
synthesized an idealist aesthetic from various sources.13 In sum, Tange and
Kawazoe presented the sengū and shrines as truly Japanese, while their
formal simplicity and “plain, unadorned surface[s]” ostensibly aligned them
with certain idealist strands of 20th century abstraction as well.14 This
interpretation was soon to be challenged.
Ise under wraps: Isozaki, Barthes, and Sakabe
The foremost Japanese advocate of the post-structuralist interpretation of
Ise is the architect Isozaki Arata, an associate of the “Tange Lab” at TokyoPhilosophy East & West
University during the time Tange and Kawazoe were recruiting Ise to their
cause. Isozaki however was suspicious of Metabolism, and from the
1970s onward his work—both written and built—became increasingly
provocative. The smashed and sunken public plaza of his Tsukuba
Center (1983), for example, a seemingly earthquake-stricken inversion of
Michelangelo’s 16th century Piazza del Campidoglio in Rome, was
contemporary with the efforts of Bernard Tschumi, Peter Eisenman, and
Jacques Derrida to “deconstruct” the conventions of a public park with La
Villette in Paris. But before looking into Isozaki’s thoughts on Ise, we
should consider his influences: the philosophers Roland Barthes and
Sakabe Megumi.
Empire of Signs (1970), a philosophical memoir of a visit in 1966, found
Barthes scouring Japan for evidence of his thesis that culture offers no stable
foundation of truth or value, and his examples were legion.15 The most
important for us are his remarks on haiku and on Japanese packaging. Haiku
seem to allude to profundity within their brief and often mundane three
lines, but they are merely brief and mundane: “the haiku’s flash illumines,
reveals nothing; it is the flash of a photograph one takes very carefully . . .
but having neglected to load the camera with film.” Their significance lies
only in mirroring the tropes of other haiku but “the mirror is empty,” thus
they are recited “twice, in echo . . . [to underline] the nullity of meaning.”16
Barthes saw this everywhere in Japan, but especially in the Japanese love for
elaborate, multilayered product packaging:[Packaging] postpones the discovery of the object it contains – one which is
often insignificant, for it is precisely a specialty of the Japanese that the triviality
of the thing be disproportionate to the luxury of the envelope . . . Thus the box
acts the sign: an envelope, screen, mask, it is worth what it conceals, protects,
and yet designates . . . but the very thing it encloses and signifies is for a very
long time put off until later, as if the package’s function were not to protect in
space but to postpone in time; it is in the envelope that the labor of the
confection (of the making) seems to be invested, but thereby the object loses its
existence, becomes a mirage: from envelope to envelope, the signified flees,
and when you finally have it (there is always a little something in the package),
it appears insignificant, laughable, vile.17Barthes seemed unaware of Ise, although we can imagine what his reading
might have been: packaged seductively in ritual and fences to be
unwrapped at the tantalizingly postponed twentieth year, the meaning
dodges away; one gift—the kodenshi—exposed empty and trivial, the
hoped-for spiritual content of the other—the goshoden—wrapped up and
hidden again; two sites side-by-side equivalent to the haiku recited twice to
underline the emptiness. All that can be admired is the fresh new packaging.
And so “what is begun by one is continued by the next, without interval.”18Simon Richards 807
808Figs. 2 and 3. The real view: admiring the ‘packaging’. Comparison of old and new outer fences
of the Geku shrine in April 2014. Apart from glimpses of roofline ornamentation, the ordinary
pilgrim will not see much more of the shrines than this. (Images and copyright owned by author)
These readings were echoed in the 1980s by Sakabe Megumi, professor
of aesthetics at the University of Tokyo, who interrogated the indigenous
language Yamato to expose the emptiness of Japanese aesthetic culture.19
Sakabe poked at terminological ambiguities in Nō masked drama, which
attained its highest form under the practitioner–theorist Zeami Motokiyo in
the 14th and 15th centuries, to diagnose meaninglessness: “In the original
language . . . there is only one word to indicate mask as well as (the natural)
face, ‘omote.’” Sakabe contrasted omote with the Latin “persona,” which
denoted not only mask but also “the notion of individual and autonomous
‘person’” behind it. Recalling Barthes’ reprehensible physiognomic diagnosis
of the depthlessness of Japanese culture from the facial features of Japanese
people, Sakabe’s omote was a depthless surface behind which lies nothing.
In Japan generally, he concluded, words never point to “substantial beings,”
concepts, objects, or even “some ideal entity (as in the case of Platonism)”
that might lie behind.20 Sakabe noted also that the Japanese word for
imitation (modoki) implied something “poorly done . . . false, counterfeit,”Philosophy East & West
of meaning annihilated “through doubling, mockery,” and he aligned this
with Barthesian “text” where “nothing exists” but “surfaces,” “reflections,”
“changes,” “metamorphoses.”21
Isozaki worked these ideas into Japan-ness in Architecture (2006). Prints,
novels, and tourist literature showed that the Ise shrine buildings and precincts
had changed over time, yet the myth persisted that there was no “deviation . . .
in the repetition,” that “The beginning form is simply traced by a re-enactment.”
Ise was “significantly redesigned at crucial junctures,” then, although “a certain
will to readjust the design toward a perceived authentic form . . . [and]
recapture the ‘pure’ form, or archetype . . . must constantly have been at work.”
Even so, this was not “an original form,” but merely a “mirage-like . . . non-
existent origin [that] is always veiled in gesture.” The origins of Ise were fiction,
sustained by the charade of the sengū:Something essential is veiled, or so we feel. When you visit Ise, you experience the
true object as blocked and invisible . . . At the headwater of Ise’s seduction, we
encounter the self-veiling mechanism . . . an obscuring mechanism . . . whose
origin itself must be somehow fabricated, for there is no origin as such. Insinuation
that an origin exists has sustained the seduction. What is seen deep in the cedar
forest is a swindle – or veiling . . . what we have to do is pay attention to the rhetoric
of veiling employed in this fabrication of origin – the only “real” truth at Ise.22This veiling “mechanism” included also the fences that block access and
views. Isozaki concluded that there is no more substance to Ise than the
ritual of renaming, equivalent to the Ō-name-sai ceremony of succession
when the imperial spirit enters a new body.23
And yet Isozaki remained ambivalent. Shintō shrines may be little more
than small enclosures marked off with string, but “these minimal acts – siting
and demarcation – suffice.” They correspond with the elusive sense of
transcendence associated with Shintō divinities:This notion of kami is not anything solid or constant, but was originally an
invisible presence invited from somewhere. The objective locus of festival and
ritual is just a device for their advent. Thus the kami never manifests itself and
can easily depart. The place to invite such kami may be essentially void – a
“central nothing.” Being void, it can also absorb.24Thus the empty sites of the kodenshi are more vibrant with potential meaning
than the goshoden alongside them.25 This reinforced earlier readings of Ise by
Tange. There was no direct figuration of the Shintō kami, Tange observed, but
instead an aspirational gesture: the clearing away and demarcation of spaces
and objects, for example, through rice-straw ropes (shimenawa) or rock
arrangements (iwasaka), into which it was hoped a kami might enter. “Instead
of thinking in terms of images of the deities,” Tange observed, “man thought
in terms of an image of the space in which the deities moved, and proceeded
in various ways to symbolize this space.”26Simon Richards 809
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kū, denoting stillness, silence, and void before the hoped-for moment of
enlightenment, and madori, the nearest equivalent for Western architectural
“design,” where ma suggests “interval” or “between-ness” in both temporal
and spatial senses while dori suggests the “grasping” of this. Together they
implicate design as the creation of ambiguous time-spaces held in expectant
tension.27 Isozaki curated an exhibition around this concept. “Ma: Space-
Time in Japan,” which opened in Paris in 1978, presented traditional
examples of this aesthetic of ambiguity and anticipation, including the
aimless stroll spaces of Japanese gardens, those moments of stillness and
quiet in Nō known as “non-action” (senu tokoro), sumie painting where the
ink-wash line floats in empty white space, as well as architectural elements
such as shōji and fusuma that serve as indeterminate windows, doors, and
walls. As well as adopting a post-structuralist line on Ise, then, where
veiling, impermanence, and the sengū represent a charade intended to
conceal meaninglessness, Isozaki suggested contrarily that the same qualities
represent the anticipation of meaning and even transcendence. And he
combined this intriguingly with Tange’s idealism when remarking that
the sengū sought “to preserve identity through maintenance of an
archetypal form.”28
Ambiguities in traditional aesthetics: Saitō, Norinaga, and Kenkō
Isozaki’s alternative interpretation ties into a strand of traditional Japanese
aesthetics involving the celebration of artifacts and experiences that are
concealed or fragmentary, including buildings that fall into dilapidation then
to be rebuilt. The philosopher Saitō Yuriko has explored this across a wide
range of Japanese arts and life practices. She discusses the Heian-era
aristocratic sentiment of mono no aware (“the pathos of things”), encapsulated
in literature such as Sei Shōnagon’s The Pillow Book and Murasaki Shikibu’s
The Tale of Genji (both ca. 1000), with their wistfulness at loss and the
passage of time, and Buddhist monk Yoshida Kenkō’s Essays in Idleness (ca.
1330), which celebrated motifs such as the moon behind clouds and falling
cherry blossoms as well as chipped utensils, frayed scrolls, and incomplete
collections. These sentiments fed the 16th century wabi-sabi aesthetic of
dilapidation and decay epitomized by tea master Sen-no-Rikyū, who
advocated meticulous care in the design and equipage of tea houses to make
them appear as ramshackle peasant huts. Saitō’s examples are comprehensive,
even including—in a pointed reversal of Barthes—the delayed gratification of
multiple layers of gift packaging. All these suggest “the celebration of those
qualities commonly regarded as falling short of, or deteriorating from, the
optimal condition of the object.” But these were not only celebrated merely
as a symbol of the transience of life and the inevitability of material decay
and disappointment, but also for what they imply of the truly satisfying
experience that is tantalizingly imminent yet just out of reach:Philosophy East & West
the appreciation of the imperfect was not merely directed towards the sensory
qualities such as asymmetry, irregularity or obscurity, or their contrast with the
opposite qualities. These qualities are aesthetically appreciable precisely
because their opposites are possible to achieve . . . the positive aesthetic
experience of concealment and obscurity presupposes a premise that the object
of quest will be available to us sooner or later.29Saitō’s interpretation invokes the literary theorist Motoori Norinaga, an
advocate of the pro-Shintō kokukagu (“nativism”) school of thought in the
late 18th century. Norinaga was fiercely critical of the popular definition of
mono no aware as melancholy over the impermanence of material
phenomena and earthly life. Although there are more melancholy than
joyful poems in the canonical anthologies of the Heian era this did not
mean that people harbored a “hope for being lonesome and sad.” Such an
interpretation, when combined with the celebration of the transiency of
one’s own life, was a “violation of . . . general human desire . . . carried
over from foreign customs.” Norinaga turned this into a thumping attack
on Kenkō and advocated instead an aesthetic that aspired toward clarity,
perfection, and order, which he presented as closest to native Japanese
taste and broader human nature.30 He developed this through a painstak-
ing etymological analysis of the word aware in Heian poetry, which
concluded: first, that aware was a broad empathetic response that might
be uttered in response to anything, including delight, surprise, laughter,
lust, contempt, fury, disgust, or intrigue, meaning that “the definition of
aware as the heart’s movement because of a specific feeling (sorrow) is
derivative”; second, that aware represented a search for the stable and
transcendent truths contained within the Yamato language and uttered
originally by the Shintō kami.31
Despite Norinaga’s quarrel with Kenkō, their aesthetics were not
dissimilar. It is true that Kenkō made mournful statements about bodily
decline and death, wondering “What pleasure is to be found while we await
them?” But he did not, as Norinaga alleged, advocate the aesthetic
celebration of decay, transience, and sadness as ends in themselves. On the
contrary, while “It is the ephemeral nature of things that makes them
wonderful,” this is because they encourage one to “taste life to the full.”
Whenever Kenkō mentions the pleasure of things and situations that are
imperfect, concealed, or unattainable, it is clear that the pleasure derives
from the memory of a time when they were perfect, revealed, and attained,
and the anticipation of a time when they might be so again. The melancholy
of year’s end and the onset of winter is enlivening, as “watching the new
year dawn in the sky, you are stirred by a sense of utter newness, although
the sky looks no different from yesterday’s.” And it is the same with less
than perfect buildings, furnishings, and fabrics: “Something left not quite
finished is very appealing, a gesture toward the future.”32Simon Richards 811
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melancholy as moments in a broader aesthetic experience that yearns for
the ideal, but others disagreed. The 20th century philosopher Ōnishi
Yoshinori, for example, asserted that aware denoted misery, decay, and
“world-weariness,” an aesthetic “developed completely among our own
people . . . that is completely alien to the West.” Although Norinaga argued
the opposite, Ōnishi contended that he did not know his own mind and was
in agreement unconsciously.33 Western commentators have also fixated on
the aesthetic of impermanence and its uniqueness to Japan. Aware might be
taken for melancholy, sabi for the ramshackle and rusted, yūgen for the
hidden mysteries of Nō, and ukiyo for transient, illicit night-pleasures, even
while it is admitted that much of this feels like “hackneyed imagery.”34
“Generalizations are always risky,” Donald Keene warned, before doing the
same.35 While melancholy and impermanence certainly appear in Western
art, they are alleged to be unwelcome there, whereas in Japan they represent
“a special penchant for finding beauty in such incessant change.”36
We can begin to unite these strands by recalling Isozaki’s ambiguous
interpretation of Ise. The orchestration of the sengū and the concealment of
the shrines exemplified post-structuralist ideas on the emptiness and fraud of
culture, he said. But they also exemplified traditional Japanese aesthetics
where impermanence and emptiness implied not only melancholy enjoyed
for its own sake but also a striving for the ideal, as Saitō, Norinaga, and
Kenkō confirmed. And this was echoed in the Metabolists’ characterization
of Ise as changeable yet also eternal. These interpretations seem to point
toward a united aesthetic but, in the main, the critical and philosophical
discourse sidelines idealism or derides it as a Western imposition. The next
section confirms this bias with some recent debates about Ise before
challenging it on the basis of a less doctrinaire interpretation of idealism.
“The Completeness of Incompleteness”: Contested Interpretations of
Classical Idealism and Its Uptake in Japan
“Plato was not Japanese”?
The buildup to any sengū always inspires scholars to interrogate Ise afresh,
and the latest was no exception.
Dominic McIver Lopes investigated Ise through contradictory “Old” and
“Young” propositions: “(O) Ise Jingu is more than one thousand years old.
(Y) Ise Jingu is no more than twenty years old.” The “standard ontology” of
architecture, favoring proposition Y, links authenticity to the enduring
materiality of a building: “no building survives the simultaneous replacement
of all its parts.” But at Ise, the new shrines are considered authentic
originals. Lopes explained this by emphasizing its temporal over its material
aspects: Ise should be considered a performative work similar to music.37
Rafael De Clercq responded that Lopes’ thesis “must look strange even toPhilosophy East & West
the Japanese.” For De Clercq, the standard ontology (O) sufficed when one
acknowledged that “a different building [can] be supposed to be the Ise
Jingū at different times in history.” Successive presidents become the
president through the transfer of authority into a different person, he noted,
which recalls Isozaki’s remarks on the imperial Ō-name-sai ceremony. The
situation is identical at Ise, where ritual marks the transfer of sacred authority
into a new shrine.38
Jeffrey Perl considered Japan a copying culture. Japanese collectors of
ukiyo-e, for example, admire reprints from recarved woodblocks more than
first prints off the original. Reprints “are not thought of as facsimiles, in the
Western derogatory sense; they are originals of a fresh edition of an old,
well-loved design.” Here and at Ise, “Japanese ontology . . . as Roland
Barthes explained . . . differs radically” from the west, which favored
“architectural, as well as ontological, foundationalism . . . ideals of solidity
[and] permanence.” “Plato was not Japanese,” Perl decided.39 Wayne
Anderson responded by agreeing, and aligning the sengū with Barthes’ notion
of creativity as “substitution and nomination,” which results not in worthless
copies but in “sustained originality.” Questions of authenticity are “so intricate
and unclear . . . [that] we may as well decide” through arbitrary naming “as if
the object existed.” A linguistic convention equivalent to the “moving
constant” of kingship was held for the transferral of authenticity in woodblock
prints, the shrines at Ise, and the multiple-edition bronzes of Auguste Rodin.40
This was a reference to the quarrel between art critic Rosalind Krauss
and curator Albert Elsen over the “Rodin Rediscovered” exhibition in the
early 1980s. Krauss had presented Rodin’s casting practices in terms of the
post-structuralist condition of reproductions-without-originals, while Elsen
defended Rodin in terms of the conventional market practice whereby
authorial sanction of a reproduced piece made it authentic.41 These recent
discussions of Ise cover the same ground: endless reproduction offset with
legitimacy granted through linguistic convention. The “opposing” arguments
blur together, unsurprisingly, as all are contained within post-structuralist
horizons. They consider movement, change, repetition, and decay—at Ise
and in Japanese aesthetics generally—to be incompatible with the search for
perfection and permanence in Western architecture and idealist aesthetics; a
position encapsulated in the vacuous truth that “Plato was not Japanese.”
For the remainder of this section, we reconsider the affinities between these
aesthetic cultures explicitly from the Western idealist side. We also consider
how attempts to segregate aesthetic cultures often have the contrary effect of
exposing common ground.
Dynamic Idealism: Plato
A discussion of authenticity in architectural restoration distinguished between
the “Platonic” approach, which favored preserving the perfected appearance
of a building, and the “Historical,” which acknowledged the passage of time,Simon Richards 813
814including degradation, patching-up, alterations, and rebuilds.42 It is a similar
binary formula that has led to the segregation of Western from Japanese
aesthetics in discussions around Ise. As the writings of Tange and Isozaki,
Kenkō, and Norinaga seem to hint, however, these alternatives are not
binding: Japanese temporality and materialism do not exclude the ideal, and
perhaps Platonic idealism does not exclude time and matter.
We must acknowledge, however, that there is an established tendency
to limit and undermine idealism. This dates to the materialist bias of the
emerging analytic tradition in the early 20th century, notably G. E. Moore’s
“The Refutation of Idealism” (1903), where he argued against George
Berkeley’s 18th century thesis of “esse est percepi”—that reality lies only in
the mind of the perceiving subject—in favor of the independent existence of
a material world outside the consciousness that perceives it.43 M. F.
Burnyeat’s “Idealism and Greek Philosophy” (1982) pushed this further to
argue that idealism emerged from the misinterpretation of ancient materialist
philosophy.44 But this characterization of idealism is a straw man, set up to
be knocked down from the pro-materialist standpoint. A recent book argues
that the “ferocious oversimplifications” of Moore, which equated idealism
with “the position that reality is mind-dependent,” represented “a poor view
of Platonism” in particular and an “impoverished understanding of idealism”
in general. This has built nonetheless into an influential discourse as well as
an orthodoxy in philosophical education that “has proved extraordinarily
resilient to correction.” In their exploration of the idealist–materialist
dialectic in Plato and other idealist and indeed materialist thinkers, the
authors argue that “The world of change, birth and decay is not a world
causally isolated from that of the Ideas.” The idea is “the cause of the
approximations of becomings to particular forms” and is therefore “insepar-
able from its moments” of partial realization in the material world over time,
which ceaselessly “generates and decays.”45 Earlier philosophers, including
Gustavus Zerffi, C. M. Bakewell, and Gustav Mueller, made similar points.
They agreed on the partial realization of ideas in the world; that a particular
idea assumes a “dynamic, moving function [that] unfolds itself” in matter
which decays and precipitates its own “critical negation”; on the wrong-
headed separation of idealism and materialism as a result of philosophical
partisanship; and on the fundamental affinity of materialism and idealism as
“twin brothers under the skin,” with “their differences consisting only in
their starting-points.”46
These arguments, although focusing on epistemology and ontology,
resonate with Plato’s idealist aesthetics. The Republic is indeed faithful to
“pure” idealism, as art was characterized there as a materialist debasement
of pure thought.47 In The Symposium, however, ostensibly a dialogue
among men discussing love, is Plato’s more nuanced theory of art.
Socrates—Plato’s avatar—argues that attraction to a lover begins on a
sensual, physical level. But after the early passions, the relationship shouldPhilosophy East & West
turn to the qualities of mind and spirit, it becoming then the elder partner’s
duty to improve his lover through lessons on virtue, character, and
comportment, and to remake him into an ever more perfect realization of
that archetype of himself that exists in a higher reality. The lover represents
the artwork and he will partake of something of the eternal in an aspirational
process that must nonetheless fail, the corruptibility of his body and mind
compromising it over time. The impossibility of attaining the ideal is
dramatized through the main authority in The Symposium, the Prophetess
Diotima. Even she appeared never to have apprehended fully the archetype
of beauty: “‘So what should we imagine it would be like,’ she said, ‘if
someone could see beauty itself, absolute, pure, unmixed, not cluttered up
with human flesh and colours and a great mass of mortal rubbish, but if he
could catch sight of divine beauty itself, in its single form? Do you think . . .
that would be a poor life for a human being . . . ?’” Plato characterized
“Love” and art not with perfect attainment and fulfillment but with frustration,
corruption, and failure; yet as the offspring of “Resource and Poverty,” they
aspire continuously and try again.48 The dynamic is similar in the Phaedrus
and Phaedo, in which Socrates describes the soul’s aspiration to return to
heaven. But the soul upon death “can never get clean away to the unseen
world [as it] is always saturated with the body . . . [and] falls back again into
another body, where it takes root and grows.”49 Life and death are
experienced, in these dialogues, as an ongoing cycle of reinventions as a
person feels not only the corrupting pull of the sensual, material world but
also strives to respond appropriately to the ideals that are realized there in
partial and imperfect forms.
This dynamic idealism has been noted by others. Phillip Sherrard
explored how Plato’s ideals were not “trans-temporal” or “static” but
discovered in the world according to the outlooks and skills of the people
who fashioned them.50 Omid Tofighian interpreted the Timaeus to mean
that humans require their art in human terms: “representations of divine
entities . . . are only beneficial if they themselves are ‘anti-divine,’ mean-
ing that they must necessarily negate themselves.” The ideal is experi-
enced as “coming to be and ceasing to be,” in the words of Timaeus, “but
never fully real.” Identifying a “copy structure” within Platonic idealism,
Tofighian argued that each copy is a “disposable vehicle” and “worthless
in-itself” but points to something beyond.51 Mueller had also described
artistic creation in Plato as a “re-creative or imitative dialectic.” Idealist
creation involves the repetition of something that paradoxically remains
unique, of something located precisely in time that remains timeless: “the
one is the other; it is one and being, hence two, hence many; the one is a
member of a series . . . The one as temporal is older and younger than and
simultaneous with itself.”52
The philosophers discussed here presented dynamic idealism as inti-
mately related with materialism and even with the Epicureans.53 ThisSimon Richards 815
816relationship was based on shared themes of incompleteness, decay,
repetition, and aspiration, precisely the themes that many have used to
describe traditional Japanese aesthetics.
Idealism Contested: Shōyō, Kusanagi, and Schopenhauer
Just as philosophers distanced materialism from idealism, so too they have
distanced Japanese aesthetics from idealism, but this has caused a
conceptual rigidifying of both aesthetic traditions. The Japanese encounter
with Western aesthetics was dominated initially by idealism, largely through
the American philosopher and art historian Ernest Fenollosa, who joined
Tokyo Imperial University in 1878. Fenollosa lectured to the general public,
academics, and learned societies on Hegelian idealism, where the value of
art lay in its providing an historical record of the transcendental “Idea,”
“Spirit,” or “Consciousness,” as it came to be articulated in material form.
This process was not linear but discontinuous, full of failures and regressions
as people struggled to shape their world, while the mysteriously self-aware
idea “pushes on, seeks, divines, and produces . . . without attaining absolute
satisfaction and therefore without repose.”54 Fenollosa argued for a
geographical relocation of Hegel’s philosophy and combined it with the
Japanese aestheticization of incompleteness: the idea would no longer enjoy
“Teutonic fulfillment.”55
Okakura Kakuzō, who assisted Fenollosa in collecting Japanese anti-
quities for public collections, took headship of the Tokyo Fine Arts Academy
in 1890 on a traditionalist ethos that successfully overturned earlier govern-
ment policy to promulgate Yōga (Western art). Okakura succeeded his
mentor as curator of Asian art at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts in 1911
and much of the intellectual energy of his career was motivated by this
Asiatic Hegelianism, emphasizing the importance of human striving with
materials even though the results may be imperfect and their decay
unavoidable. Lecturing in Boston on “Nature in East Asiatic Painting” (1911),
he stated that “what is important is the joy of life coursing through these
forms and striving for higher achievements.”56 And earlier, in The Ideals of
the East (1903), he maintained that the inferred meanings and mysteries of
haiku, Nō, and sumie all “held steadily to the Oriental Romantistic [sic] ideal
. . . the expression of the Spirit as the highest achievement in art.”57
Other thinkers at the time were fascinated by this philosophical fusion:
Mori Ōgai wrote Japanese translations and commentaries on German
idealism, while Ōnishi Hajime formulated a Japano-Christian Hegelianism as
an attack upon Buddhism and Shintō.58 But idealism was rejected by many
Japanese scholars as an unwelcome foreign imposition. The novelist and
playwright Tsubouchi Shōyō, for example, quarreled publicly with Ōgai and
Ōnishi.59 Shōyō armed himself with Eugène Véron’s anti-Platonic thesis,
L’Esthétique (1878), which adhered to the strict dualist interpretation of
Plato: “human intelligence is inert” in the face of unattainable ideals, andPhilosophy East & West
Plato’s disregard for materiality “logically results in the negation of all
expression, life, and progress” from art and “reduces [the artist] to . . . a
mere copyist.” Véron’s interrogation of Plato—“Have you received the
power and peculiar privilege to enter the abstract world of celestial
metaphysics, from which everyone else in excluded?”—ignored the
materialist–idealist dynamic that underlay Plato’s mature philosophy.60
When filtered through Shōyō’s “What is Beauty?” (1886), which excoriated
the “empty theory of a certain figure”—his former teacher Fenollosa—now
“revered . . . as if he were a god,” the results were similar. Shōyō
lampooned the aspiration to “imitate formless things [and] formless spirits.”
He favored Japanese traditions, like haiku, that focus on objects and
experiences to distil “the essence of the situation.” These essences, however,
were “mysterious,” aspiring to capture “things that cannot exist and cannot
generally be seen in reality,” which differed little from idealism even in the
moment of rejecting it.61 According to Marra, Shōyō had failed “to properly
interpret Fenollosa’s notion of ‘idea’ (myōsō) in the Platonic sense of ‘ideal’
and the Hegelian sense of Idee,” all indicating transcendent content not in
its pure state but when embodied in material and experienced by the
senses.62
Writing nearly a century later in “The Logic of Passional Surplus” (1972),
the philosopher Kusanagi Masao likewise brought Japanese and Western
aesthetics into elegant alignment while insisting paradoxically on their
irreconcilableness. He was explaining the power of yojōbi, that uncertain
feeling caused by the empty areas of a painting or the pauses of a poem:
“since human beings live only a finite actual existence . . . transcendence,
when it appears, can only be read each time instantaneously within
historical time . . . This means that [with art] you have fragmentariness and
incompletion.” Kusanagi aligned this with “the philosophy of imperma-
nence” of Buddhist and Shintō aesthetics and contended that Western
philosophers had only recently awoken to it, citing Karl Jaspers’ update of
Hegelian idealism (Philosophy, 1932) as an example.63 For Jaspers, the finite
intellect and lifespan of humans meant that transcendence could be
glimpsed only “within the limits of border situations,” as fragmentary
“traces” or “ciphers” that are experienced in passing, often anxiously and
sadly. But this melancholic striving was authentic “Existenz”: in the words of
Jaspers, “the world is not self-sustaining but perishing all the time,”
consequently “transcending is an otherwise irremediable disquiet about the
impermanence of all existence.”64
Jaspers’ ideas echoed Arthur Schopenhauer’s in The World as Will and
Representation (1818, 1844), which presented the dynamic aspects of Plato’s
idealism from the viewpoint of a person experiencing it. Imprisoned in the
world of “will,” of everyday striving and frustration, people glimpsed
transcendence only in fragments: “In this state pure knowing comes to us . . .
to deliver us from willing and its stress. We follow, yet only for a fewSimon Richards 817
818moments; willing, desire, the recollection of our own personal aims, always
tears us anew from peaceful contemplation; but yet again and again the next
beautiful environment . . . entices us away from willing.” Transcendence
could be experienced, moreover, only when mixed with matter in works of
art, corresponding to the “mingled and divided state” of human being itself,
and with melancholy acknowledgment that the moment must pass.65
Kusanagi referred also to Joseph Gartner, Dagobert Frey, and Herbert von
Einem, who explored the unfinished works and sketches of Michelangelo,
Rembrandt, and Rodin, but concluded that Westerners saw the incomplete as
simply incomplete, an abandoned failure or at best preparatory sketch, while
for the Japanese incompletion had always been the starting point—an
“existential basis”—and the goal: “We can call it the completeness of
incompleteness,” where the ideal and its manifestation as a fragment are “tied
together in a chain of necessity.” For Kusanagi, this was quintessentially
Japanese.66 But Schopenhauer too saw the preparatory sketch as full of a
vibrancy and yearning that was seldom matched by the finished painting, and
believed that it pointed more powerfully to ideals precisely because it was
incomplete. The same went for the unresolved poetic metaphor or the rough
sculpture maquette.67
Attempts to erect barriers between Japanese and Western aesthetics are
often nourished by the hard-line interpretation of idealism that ignores its
dynamic engagement with materiality. Consequently, it is unsurprising when
they fail to convince.
Conclusion
We have used Ise and the sengū to reconsider the relationship between
Japanese and Western aesthetics. Recent interpretations seem locked into
one of two paths: first, the qualities of repetition and perishability are seen
in relation to traditional Japanese aesthetics indicating the frailty of earthly
things; second, these same qualities are seen in terms of the ostensible
emptiness and reproducibility of all culture and linked to post-structuralism.
Regardless of the path taken, it is almost invariably contrasted with
“western-only” philosophical idealism, understood as the pursuit of change-
less, eternal values: “in Japan it is the form that counts. Not form in the
Platonic sense of some antecedent pattern beyond the world of change, but
form as concretely embodied in a finite, impermanent building.”68 This
represents an unsound reading of idealism that hinders discussion of
similarities between aesthetic cultures. Many idealists admitted partial and
flawed realization of ideals in the material world as part of a recurring,
aspirational process. This is a dynamic idealism that is not only compatible
with incompleteness, but requires incompleteness in order to be huma-
nized. Clearly this is known among some Japanese and Western thinkers,
yet it is usually suppressed under a more established discourse fixated onPhilosophy East & West
asserting difference. Unique as Ise and the sengū are, a less monolithic
reading of Western idealism in relation to the Japanese aesthetic of
incompleteness suggests that they speak to something common in the way
people, faced with the loss of things that are important to them, have tried
to articulate their ideals not against time but within its flow: “Time,”
Schopenhauer concluded, “is merely the spread-out and piecemeal view
that an individual has of the Ideas . . . Plato says that time is the moving
image of eternity.”69Acknowledgements
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